" Supporters of the Abood approach argue that it is a reasonable compromise that prevents non-members from free riding on the union's efforts (i.e. enjoying the wages and benefits negotiated by the union without sharing the costs incurred). Detractors and the plaintiffs in Friedrichs argue that free riding concerns are insufficient to overcome serious First Amendment objections. The central idea is that all bargaining in the public sector is inherently political. Public sector pays, tenure and benefits (especially expensive retiree health care and pension promises), it is claimed, now profoundly affect the ability of state and local governments to function in many jurisdictions. This article briefly reviews the major claim in Friedrichs-that public sector agency agreements violate the First Amendment--and considers the implications of a decision that, but for Justice Scalia's unexpected death almost certainly would have overturned Abood. What would this mean for financially strapped state and local governments? To understand what a victory for the Friedrichs plaintiffs would mean, this paper looks at recent data from Wisconsin which dramatically constrained public sector agency agreements a few years ago and has seen public union membership, union revenue and political power plunge as a result. If Friedrichs had overturned Abood during the 2016 term, we would now expect to see national patterns similar to those observed in Wisconsin. In many places around the country a drop in public sector INTRODUCTION
Until recently, conventional wisdom suggested that the petitioners in the Friedrichs 1 case were likely to prevail on their core claim that payment of agency fees to a public sector union (in this case the California Teachers Association) violated non-union members' First Amendment rights by forcing them to subsidize political speech with which they disagree.
2 The 1 The petitioners first filed their suit to end mandatory union dues on April 29, 2013. The case was decided rather fast by the district court on December 5, 2013 because the petitioners requested judgment be entered for the defendant unions. Though the move seems odd, the petitioners believed their case brought up a unique legal issue and that only the Supreme Court possessed the authority to grant the relief they requested. Upon immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the petitioners again requested judgment for the defendants, and, on November 18, 2014, the Ninth Circuit granted a Summary Affirmance of the district court. Friedrichs and her coplaintiffs filed for certiorari on January 26, 2015, and the Supreme Court granted cert on June 30, 2015. The case was argued on Jan. 11, 2016 before a full Supreme Court; however, the sudden death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016 left only eight justices to decide the case. Justice Scalia, "who hinted strongly during oral arguments in January that he considered mandatory dues unconstitutional, would have likely been a deciding vote." However, on March 29, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a Per Curiam, one-line opinion: "The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court." The death of Scalia certainly led to the divided opinion, as the late justice was an all but official fifth vote for the petitioners, and allowed the unions to continue to collect mandatory union dues. Though the plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing on April 8, 2016, the still short-handed Supreme Court denied the petition on June 28, 2016, leaving the unions the freedom to collect mandatory dues for the foreseeable future. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assoc., 578 U. S. ____ (2016); Haley Sweetland Edwards, How Antonin Scalia's Death Will Help Teachers' Unions, TIME (Feb. 16, 2016) ; Freidrichs v CTA: Case Timeline, THE CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. (July 16, 2016) , https://www.cirusa.org/cases/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association-et-al/friedrichs-v-ctatimeline/.
2 Justice Alito's opinions in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000 and in Harris v. Quinn make clear his view that Abood was wrongly decided and that agency fee arrangements by non-members amount to state-coerced speech, which cannot withstand the strict scrutiny required under the First Amendment.
needed to overturn Abood. 5 The Court issued a 4-4 split decision on March 29, 2016, which means Abood lives on-at least for a while. Court, Scalia Gone, Ties 4-4, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2016 ("the starkest illustration yet of how the sudden death of Antonin Scalia last month has blocked the power of the court's four remaining conservatives to move the law to the right). However, Liptak went further, explaining the broader effects of Scalia's death on the Court: "His death changed the balance of power in this case, and most likely in many others. The clout of the court's four-member liberal wing has increased significantly. Its members -Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan -can create deadlocks, as they did Tuesday, and they can sometimes attract the vote of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy for a liberal result. " Id. 6 See Daniel Hamel & David Louk, Much Abood About Nothing?, WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (Mar. 29, 2016) , https://medium.com/whatever-sourcederived/much-abood-about-nothing-447dbe2758eb#.hd1dp0tcc. Hamel and Louk lay out the significance of allowing Abood to live on, but suggest there may be an alternative for Abood's "agency shops" in a so-called "direct payment alternative." Id. However, they recognize that this alternative would not be feasible in states with a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor, where Abood is all that allows unions the power to collect from unwilling participants.
Laws in almost half of U.S. states allow unions and public sector employers to set up so-called "agency shops." Employees in an agency shop need not join their local union, but the workers who opt not to join the union still must pay a "fair-share" or "agency" fee to cover their pro rata portion of the union's collective bargaining costs. This less-than-total membership cost is either a constitutionally impermissible compulsory payment or a reasonable compromise that has served both labor and public sector employers' interests well for many years. At oral argument it certainly appeared there were five votes in favor of the former position and, as one commentator noted, "Abood is in plenty of trouble." 7 This paper is not about the merits of the arguments made in Freidrichs nor does it offer a theory of the First Amendment or of collective bargaining in the public sector. There exists a substantial body of work, which attempts to do one or more of these things. 'Y SIDEBAR 229 (2016) (discussing a potential constitutional challenge public-sector unions would face in Friedrichs that might "lead to their demise;" further discussing the potential for expected effects of a decision, which was on the verge of overturning Abood, and, in particular, the effect of such a change on public sector employee benefits costs and total budgets.
Using data from Wisconsin following that state's enactment of Act 10 (the 2011 Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill), 9 which largely eliminated collective bargaining for state public employees, I trace the effects on membership in Wisconsin's largest teacher union and on it lobbying efforts and membership levels. Act 10 has been nothing short of catastrophic for Wisconsin's public sector unions.
10 There is every reason to believe that the It is for this reason that the conditions in Wisconsin post-Act 10 provide a near-perfect laboratory in which to examine what happens when public sector unions can no longer compel even a modest level of support for their activities from members and non-members. What can be observed in Wisconsin is an astonishing drop in public sector union membership levels, and lobbying activity (which I view as a reasonable proxy for political strength). To the extent that public sector union strength accounts for the level of spending on employee benefits-especially pensions and high cost health insurance for active employees and retirees-we should expect to see these costs come down over time in Wisconsin and in any other state that outlaws agency fees. This means that strained state budgets could well be the first beneficiaries of the movement to eliminate agency fees.
13 This move-toward private ordering of wages and benefits in the public sector and away from the morally hazardous process that currently determines the overall compensation of public employees 14 -will have a profound effect on President Obama's current nominee, Merrick Garland, has failed to even be given a hearing in the Senate at the time this paper was written); Id. 
II. LESSONS FROM WISCONSIN AFTER ACT 10
To understand what a post-Friedrichs world might have looked like, it helps to look back at the changes that have taken place in Wisconsin since the passage of Act 10 in 2011. Also known as the Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, Act 10 was signed into law by then newly-elected Governor Scott Walker.
16 Act 10 largely eliminated collective bargaining for public employees in the state except for law enforcement and fire protection personnel.
17 Act 10 expressly forbid general employees from bargaining A. H. Raskin wrote in 1968: "The community cannot tolerate the notion that it is defenseless at the hands of organized workers to whom it has entrusted responsibility for essential services." "When it comes to advancing their interests, public-sector unions have significant advantages over traditional unions. For one thing, using the political process, they can exert far greater influence over their members' employers -that is, government -than private-sector unions can. Through their extensive political activity, these government-workers' unions help elect the very politicians who will act as "management" in their contract negotiations -in effect handpicking those who will sit across the bargaining table from them, in a way that workers in a private corporation (like, say, American Airlines or the Washington Post Company) cannot. Such power led Victor Gotbaum, the leader of District Council 37 of the AFSCME in New York City, to brag in 1975: "We have the ability, in a sense, to elect our own boss. Id. at 6-7, 10.
15 How fast this happens will be a function of the perceived political orientation of Justice Scalia's replacement.
16 Assemb. B. 11, 2011 Assemb. B. 11, -2012 Prohibited subjects of bargaining; general municipal employees. The municipal employer is prohibited from bargaining collectively with a collective bargaining unit containing a general municipal employee with respect to any of the following: 1. Any factor or condition of employment except wages, which includes only total base wages and excludes any other compensation, which includes, but is not limited to, overtime, premium pay, merit pay, performance pay, supplemental compensation, pay schedules, and automatic pay progressions.
Id.
19 Id at § 111.06 (1) (i). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer individually or in concert with others . . .
[t]o deduct labor organization dues or assessments from an employee's earnings, unless the employer has been presented with an individual order therefore, signed by the employee personally, and terminable by the employee giving to the employer at least 30 days' written notice of the termination. This paragraph applies to the extent permitted under federal law.
20 Id at § 111.83 (3) (b). Annually, no later than December 1, the commission shall conduct an election to certify the representative of a collective bargaining unit that contains a general employee. There shall be included on the ballot the names of all labor organizations having an interest in representing the general employees participating in the election. The commission may exclude from the ballot one who, at the time of the election, stands deprived of his or her rights under this subchapter by reason of a prior adjudication of his or her having engaged in an unfair labor practice. The commission shall certify any representative that receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of the general employees in the collective bargaining unit. If no representative receives at least 51 percent of the votes of all of the general employees in the collective bargaining unit, at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the commission shall decertify the current representative and the general employees shall be nonrepresented. (a) No fair-share or maintenance of membership agreement covering public safety employees may become effective unless authorized by a referendum. The commission shall order a referendum whenever it receives a petition supported by proof that at least 30 percent of the public safety employees in a collective bargaining unit desire that a fair-share or maintenance of membership agreement be entered into between the employer and a labor organization. A petition may specify that a referendum is requested on a maintenance of membership agreement only, in which case the ballot shall be limited to that question. (b) For a fair-share agreement to be authorized, at least two-thirds of the eligible public safety employees voting in a referendum shall vote in favor of the agreement. For a maintenance of membership agreement to be authorized, at least a majority of the eligible public safety employees voting in a referendum shall vote in favor of the agreement. In a referendum on a fair-share agreement, if less than two-thirds but more than one-half of the eligible public safety employees vote in favor of the agreement, a maintenance of membership agreement is authorized. 
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alia, that Act 10 violated the constitutional free speech, free association and equal protection rights of the represented employees. The Wisconsin Circuit Court agreed with the unions and invalidated several provisions of Act 10, including those related to collective bargaining. On July 31, 2014 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a 5 to 2 decision reversed the lower court ruling and upheld Act 10 in its entirety. The Court's view was that while union members certainly enjoy a constitutional right to free association, that protection does not extend to collective bargaining. Justice Gableman wrote for the majority:
This point is vital and bears repeating: the plaintiff's associational rights are in no way implicated by Act 10's modifications to Wisconsin's collective bargaining framework. At issue in this case is the State's implementation of an exclusive representation system for permitting public employers and public employees to negotiate certain employment terms in good faith . . . Represented municipal employees, non-represented municipal employees, and certified representatives lose no right or ability to associate to engage in constitutionally protected speech because their ability to do so outside the framework of statutory collective bargaining is not impaired. Act 10 merely provides general employees with a statutory mechanism to force their employer to collectively bargain; outside of this narrow context, to which the plaintiffs freely concede public employees have no constitutional right, every avenue for petitioning the government remains available. 24 Essentially, the majority in Walker adopts the view that constitutional protections of freedom of association are not impaired because Commission challenging several provisions of Act 10. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that four aspects of Act 10-the collective bargaining limitations, the prohibition on payroll deductions of labor organization dues, the prohibition of fair share agreements, and the annual recertification requirements-violate the constitutional associational and equal protection rights of the employees they represent. The plaintiffs also challenged Wis. Stat. § 62.623 (2011-12) , a separate provision created by Act 10, which prohibits the City of Milwaukee from paying the employee share of contributions to the City of Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System, alleging it violates the home rule amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution. th Circuit rejected the argument that the prohibition on payroll deductions violated the First Amendment, reasoning that the unions' previous use of the payroll system was the equivalent of the state subsidizing the unions' speech and that Wisconsin was free to withdraw this subsidy so long as it did so on a viewpoint neutral basis.
29
The second case-Laborers Local 236-rehashed arguments made unsuccessfully in Wisconsin state court-i.e. that Act 10 impaired union members' right to freedom of association. The argument, which the 7 th Circuit rejected, was essentially that Act 10 undermines the ability of labor organizations to continue to function and weakens their association to a devastating extent, thereby depriving members of the right to freedom of association. Judge Flaum wrote for the majority:
[T]he First Amendment does not require the state to maintain policies that allow certain associations to thrive…Act 10 only acts upon the state. The law's changes agents, and precluded general-employee unions from using automatic payroll deductions and fair-share agreements. The plaintiffs, two public-employee unions and an individual union member, argue that these changes infringe their First Amendment petition and association rights. They also argue that Act 10 denies union members the equal protection of the laws. Financial hardship has translated into reduced political power. According to the state of Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, for each of the three years leading up to Act 10's passage, WEAC was either first or second in total dollars spent lobbying at the state level.
33 From 2009 to 2011 WEAC spent an average of $1.9 million per year on lobbying. After Act 10, WEAC spent only $175,540 which meant it was not even in the top twelve of lobbying spenders.
34
Why did membership drop so dramatically? Act 10 meant that dues could no longer be automatically withdrawn from member paychecks and non-members were no longer required to make a "fair share" payment. If you did not want to be a union member, you were now free to go it alone and no longer compelled to pay the agency fee. This is precisely the result the Friedrichs plaintiffs hoped for on a national scale.
A sample of comments from former WEAC members demonstrates their post-Act 10 thinking:
 "I don't see the point of being in a union anymore. Everyone is on their own island now. If you do a good job, everything will take care of itself. 34 Beck, supra note 30, ("Walker spokeswoman Laurel Patrick said Saturday that Act 10 'put the power back in the hands of the people and local governments, saving Wisconsin taxpayers more than $3 million in the process and allowing public employees the freedom to choose if they want to join a union.'"). 35 Robert Samuels, Walker's Anti-Union Has Labor Reeling in Wisconsin, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015) , https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inwisconsin-walkers-anti-union-law-has-crippled-labormovement/2015/02/22/1eb3ef82-b6f1-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html (statement from 34-year old technology teacher Dan Anliker). Public-sector unions have begun using their clout against efforts to roll back government workers' wages and benefits, cut jobs and curtail contract bargaining rights as political leaders from both parties look for ways to cut spending. Two of the nation's biggest public-sector unions, which together represent about 2.2 million government workers, are facing a backlash against the rising costs of public workers' pay, benefits and pensions. As states and local governments seek to trim costs in a difficult economy, the unions are struggling to defend pay and benefit packages negotiated when times were flush. 
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was a way to avoid cutting budgets and popular eliminating programs in the face of public sector union intransigence.
42
For example, the Mequon-Thiensville School District near Milwaukee froze teacher salaries for two years thereby saving $560,000. It saved an additional $400,000 by requiring higher contributions to healthcare plans. Administrators argue that circumventing the collective bargaining process and the union allowed them to "shift money out of the health plan and back into the classroom.
[They]'ve increased programming" as a result. 43 It is clear that Walker successfully portrayed the public unions as selfish and intransigent in the face of financial crisis. It is also clear that the consequences of Act 10 have been nothing short of catastrophic for those unions. 44 savings the state and its municipalities were able to obtain, a longer term restructuring of wages and benefits will be possible. Benefits are likely to be the primary focus both in Wisconsin and beyond as the compensation gap between private and public employees seems to support a conclusion that it is benefits and not wages that are exceptional in the public sector.
III. ARE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES OVERPAID?
Were cities and towns that responded to Act 10 by freezing salaries, cutting benefits and generally holding the line on public employee labor costs after 2011 in fact "right sizing" or were they simply taking advantage of a newly politically vulnerable group of employees? It turns out that figuring out whether or not public employees are overcompensated is trickier than it seems. There is a substantial literature that purports to demonstrate that public school teachers and other public sector workers are overpaid. ("[w] e conclude that public-school teacher salaries are comparable to those paid to similarly skilled private sector workers, but that more generous fringe benefits for public-school teachers, including greater job security, make total compensation 52 percent greater than fair market levels, equivalent to more than $120 billion overcharged to taxpayers each year."); Steven Greenhut, California Faces Death by Pension, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Oct. 29, 2014 8:00 AM), http://spectator.org/ 60778_california-faces-death-pension/ (Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's chief pension adviser, David Crane, giving testimony in 2010 before the California Senate) ("All of the consequences of rising pension costs fall on the budgets for programs such as higher education, health and human services, parks and recreation and environmental protection that are junior in priority and therefore have their funding reduced whenever more money is needed to pay for pension costs[.]"); Robert C. Pozen, The Other Debt Bomb in Public Employee Benefits, THE WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-c-pozen-the-other-debt-bombin-public-employee-benefits-1421367030 (noting that New York City has unfunded retiree health care liabilities of $22,857 per household and recommending that jurisdictions increase disclosure of costs as a mechanism which would encourage voters to consider reform); Mark Casciari & Barbara Borowski, Rightsizing Public Employee Retirement Benefits: How Have State Courts Resolved the Constitutional Issues?, 26 BENEFITS. L. J. 22 (2013) (suggesting that states will continue to try and cutback state and local employee benefits as long as they are facing funding shortfalls).
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view. 48 Scholarly work that is not overly politicized seems to provide some support for the Walker view:
After controlling for skill differences and incorporating employer costs for benefits packages, we find that, on average, public sector workers in state government have compensation costs 3-10 percent greater than those for workers in the private sector, while in local government the gap is 10-19 percent. We caution that this finding is somewhat dependent on the chosen sample and specification, that averages can obscure broader differences in distributions, and that a host of worker and job attributes are not available to us in these data. Nonetheless that data suggest that public sector workers, especially local government ones, on average, receive greater remuneration than observably similar private sector workers.
49
A.
A MORAL HAZARD STORY As I've argued elsewhere, 50 there is certainly a growing body of evidence which supports the Walker narrative: that when public finances are 48 See Nicholas Kristof, Pay Teachers More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at WK10 ("A basic educational challenge is not that teachers are raking it in, but that they are underpaid. If we want to compete with other countries, and chip away at poverty across America, then we need to pay teachers more so as to attract better people into the profession. . . . These days, brilliant women become surgeons and investment bankers -and 47 percent of America's kindergarten through 12th-grade teachers come from the bottom one-third of their college classes [as measured by SAT scores]"). If the core problem is . . . a strong tendency to overpromise because of strong forces that encourage morally hazardous behavior, who should bear the cost when a municipality cannot keep the promises it made? Does it matter that municipal creditors are typically either very sophisticated-i.e., bondholders and their
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insurers-or possibly less savvy but often intimately involved in a long pattern of reckless spending that has directly contributed to the financial crisis-i.e., public employees and the unions that represent them? . . . Culpability for the mess in Central Falls certainly resides with the political actors who, aided and abetted by public employees, promised benefits far beyond what the poor town could afford. . . . Politicians are well known for their cavalier attitude toward "other people's money. . . .The guilty role played by public employees and their representatives is by now so well understood that it requires little further explanation. Suffice it to say that the public employee/legislator relationship was beneficial to all concerned save the current and future taxpayer. Can the elected official/lender/public employee axis be broken? The only way forward appears to be some combination of structural changes and increased transparency. A variety of proposals have been advanced in recent years; terminating defined benefit plans and moving employees to defined contribution arrangements similar to the private sector's 401 (k) vehicle is among the most promising. Modest reforms include requiring public plans to use realistic, market-based rates of return when making assumptions about asset growth that directly impact the size of future liabilities. More radical, but perhaps not unreasonable in extreme situations . . . is the call to simply bar legislators from negotiating with public unions about pensions and/or retiree health benefits. The first sign that over promising has occurred with pension promises is often the failure of the state, as with Kentucky, to make its required contribution. Why is payment not made as promised? Well, legislators remember that they have a variety of other commitments besides pensions -public education, roads, prisons, public health -to name a few. These generally require immediate spending in order to satisfy the public's demand for services. Pensions, on the other hand, are a future expense which can be delayed. Over time, of course, repeated delay creates a larger and larger shortfall which must one day be made up. But, that long term horizon is not the horizon for the typical politician who hopes/expects to have moved on to bigger and better things by the time the shortfall has mushroomed into a full blown crisis. Id. at 596-597. See also Maria O'Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for PostEmployment Healthcare, 36 PACE L. REV. 317, 368-369 (2016) ("Numerous state and local government employers have been forced to reckon with the size and scope tight and tax increases are politically infeasible, the natural cost cutting response one might expect to see is often thwarted by labor agreements which bind local governments to a cost structure that is unsustainable. It is not generally wages but instead the promises made with respect to employee benefits-pension costs and active and retiree health care commitmentsthat overwhelm states 51 and municipalities alike. The reason for this, like all stories about morally hazardous 52 behavior, is rooted in the cavalier way in of benefits that had been promised to public employees -often without much thought to the future cost to taxpayers. Indeed, some states are still trying, very publicly, to come to terms with the cost of post-employment benefits that threaten to crowd out all other spending." Costs and Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014) , http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/nyregion/new-york-city-pension-system-isstrained-by-costs-and-politics.html.
For years, New York City has been dutifully pumping more and more money into its giant pension system for retired city workers. . . . But instead of getting smaller, the city's pension hole just keeps getting bigger, forcing progressively more significant cutbacks in municipal programs and services every year. Like pension systems everywhere, New York City's has been strained by a growing retiree population that is living longer, global market conditions and other factors. But a close examination of the system's problems reveals a more glaring issue: Its investment strategy has failed to keep up with its growing costs, hampered by an antiquated and inefficient governing structure that often permits politics to intrude on decisions. The $160 billion system is spread across five separate funds, each with its own board of trustees, all making decisions with further input from consultants and even lawmakers in Albany. . .. Like many public systems, New York has promised irrevocable pension benefits to city workers on the thinking that fund investments would grow enough to cover the cost -but they have not. Its response so far has been to take advantage of a recovering local economy and inject a lot more city money into the pension system quickly -an option not available to declining cities like Detroit, which filed for bankruptcy last year, or a tax-averse state like New Jersey, which has been underfunding its pension system for years.
Id.
52 See Definition of 'Moral Hazard', ECON. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016) , http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-hazard (the Economic Times defining moral hazard as " [A] situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other party will incur the 202 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 which human beings behave when they are tasked with spending other people's money. The key insight offered by the study of moral hazard is that people treat valuable resources differently-the degree of care exercised depends on the ownership of those resources. When dollars that belong to someone else are being spent the level of care is much lower than what is observed when owned dollars are expended. This phenomenon is easy to observe in almost any insurance context. Homeowners and automobile insurers, for example, routinely require deductibles in order to minimize the likelihood that an insured will simply exercise an unacceptable level of care given the presence of the insurance. The homeowner, for example, who carelessly neglects to put out a cigarette or extinguish a fire in the fireplace or the automobile owner who parks in a dangerous neighborhood and fails to lock her vehicle are much more likely to be careful with their property in the absence of any insurance. Insurance, well aware of this problem, insist on "sharing the loss" by requiring deductibles; health insurers, wary of unnecessary visits to the doctor do the same thing by way of co-pays and other forms of cost sharing.
How is this connected to public sector employee benefits? The story of how so many cities and states have ended up overpaying for employee benefits is fundamentally a story about simple moral hazard too. Elected officials, entrusted by voters to negotiate wages and benefits with public sector employees are especially vulnerable to the moral hazard encountered when considering how to spend taxpayer dollars. Aware that the taxpayer is almost certainly not paying attention to the details 53 and eager to keep well organized groups of public employees who both vote and provide support during election campaigns happy, elected officials have, time and again, cost. It arises when both the parties have incomplete information about each other."). An example of moral hazard would be a homeowner with full homeowner's insurance choosing not to install a security system because he or she know the insurance company will bear the burden, should a burglary occur. See id. 53 Hence the calls by Pozen and others for greater transparency. Since 2003, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board ("GASB") has been studying government action and suggested that states should be more transparent in their functions, particularly in financial statements. GASB even suggests that derivatives be included in financial statement in order make more transparent what the government is leveraging to accomplish deals and transactions. (Mar. 17, 2015) , http://www.latimes.com/ business/la-fi-pension-controversy-20150317-story.html.
As millions of private employees lost their pension benefits in recent years, government workers rested easy, believing that their promised retirements couldn't be touched. Now the safety of a government pension in California may be fading fast. Feeling the heat is the state's huge public pension fund, the California Public Employees' Retirement System, known as CalPERS. The fund spent millions of dollars to defend itself and public employee pensions in the bankruptcy cases of two California cities -only to lose the legal protections that it had spent years building through legislation. The agency's most significant setback came in Stockton's bankruptcy case. The judge approved the city's recovery plan, including maintaining employees' pensions, but ruled that Stockton could have legally chosen to cut workers' retirements . . . . Part of the problem is that many cities have promised workers pensions that are more generous than those still offered in the private sector. Many government workers retire at 50 or 55 on lifelong payments that can nearly match their salaries
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In Wisconsin it really did not matter whether the unions were as intransigent as Walker portrayed them; what was critical is that the public came to believe that when a financial crisis struck, public sector employees were unwilling to face the same reduced circumstances as private sector taxpayers. Job loss, pay cuts, increased health care expenses 57 -painfully if they were longtime employees. Increasing payments to CalPERS was one reason that Stockton and San Bernardino were forced to file for bankruptcy. . . . CalPERS' efforts to protect itself and workers' retirements began decades ago when it pushed through two state laws with help from the politically powerful unions. The first law said that a city's contract with CalPERS could not be canceled in bankruptcy. The second allowed CalPERS to place a costly lien on a city's property -in essence, a new and far more expensive bill for pensions -if the city left CalPERS and provided retirement benefits through a different fund. The cost of the threatened lien was so steep -in Stockton, CalPERS demanded $1.6 billion -that no city in bankruptcy has left the fund. The small city of Central Falls, R.I., appears to be headed for a rare municipal bankruptcy filing, and state officials are rushing to keep its woes from overwhelming the struggling state. The impoverished city, operating under a receiver for a year, has promised $80 million worth of retirement benefits to 214 police officers and firefighters, far more than it can afford. Those workers' pension fund will probably run out of money in October, giving Central Falls the distinction of becoming the second municipality in the United States to exhaust its pension fund, after Prichard, Ala. . . . Some of the retirees are in their 90s, and Central Falls, like many American cities, has not placed its police and firefighters in Social Security. Many have no other benefits to fall back on.
Id.
57 The Cadillac Tax in the Affordable Care Act will begin enforcing a 40% tax of any health plan for the amount of the plan that exceeds $10,200 (for an individual plan) and $27,500 (for a family plan) in 2018. This was meant to ensure employees kept the cost of health insurance in mind and did not require employers to dole out too much for high insurance, but it resulted in union resentment, as unions have begun to have the tax leveraged against them in collective bargaining agreements.
experienced by those without the benefit of a union-did not result in union envy but in union resentment. Private sector workers did not wish they could join a public sector union; instead they wished that those who were already members would accept less so that taxes would not have to be increased or services decreased in order to survive the crisis.
The Great Recession which began in 2008 laid bare the huge differences in job protections, health care costs and retirement benefits enjoyed by public and private sector employees.
58 Private sector employers shed workers rapidly as needed. Meanwhile, the public sector unions seemed impervious to the resentment their generous benefits and job security engendered. 59 People who collected unemployment benefits 60 and struggled POLTIFACT (Sept. 16, 2011) , http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/ statements/2011/sep/16/scott-walker/gov-scott-walker-says-he-asked-unionsconcessions-/ (quoting a campaign fundraising letter written by Scott Walker, dated Sept. 2, 2011) ("I asked the unions to pay into their own health care insurance and they said I was being unreasonable . . . I requested that they contribute toward their own pensions and they screamed it was unfair.").
60 Each state's unemployment system works slightly differently, but to qualify there are some general requirements most states include. The unemployed worker and moderate income families who do not enjoy the luxurious option of private school education. 68 One cannot help but ask, if public unions are not coercing speech, then how to understand the dramatic drop in membership? Why aren't employees supporting an organization that is accurately reflecting its members' positions on a wide range of issues?
Taxpayers are asking what they have to lose if public sector union power is dramatically reduced. Wisconsin has answered that question. In the short run, as salaries are contained or reduced, budget pressure is relieved and dollars can go to services which might otherwise be cut in times of crisis. Public sector unions become less politically important and less able to articulate their views as their staffs shrink. Over the longer term we should expect to see relief for taxpayers as well from onerous benefits commitments-especially those for retiree health care, active employee health care and pensions. As others have suggested, we may see more and more public employees getting their insurance from a state of federal health care exchange. 69 In the same way the private sector shed many of the obligations 70 we would expect that state and local governments would (criticizing the American public school system for how it handles disciplining, reprimanding, and firing tenured teachers). 68 Some advocate for charter schools as a "replacement system for the failed urban [school] system." A solution like this would involve "closing low-performing traditional and charter schools" to only allow schools that are successful educators, as deemed by the local government or educational authority, to continue operating. In addition, these advocates suggest allowing failing public school to be taken over by a charter company if it means the students' quality of education will increase. Under their view, urban students are the most needy students, yet their needs are not close to being met and "well-meaning education reformers" are simply not meeting these students' needs properly. See Emma Brown, Can traditional school systems be replaced by charters?, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013) , https://www.washington post.com/blogs/dc-schools-insider/post/can-traditional-school-systems-bereplaced-by-charters/2013/01/30/e33a013a-6a71-11e2-95b3-272d604a10a3_blog.html. follow. The private ordering that has dominated everywhere but in the unionized public sector should creep into the public sector as union power there declines.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many supporters of pension and health care benefits reform for the public sector were disappointed by the stalemate produced by Freidrichs following the death of Justice Scalia. The Court seemed poised to overturn Abood and usher in a new era of in which fees for contract administration, grievance adjustment, etc. were forbidden as impermissible interference with employee free speech rights. Abood has long been justified on anti-free riding grounds, although no one seriously argued that concerns about free riding were sufficient to overcome interference with the constitutional rights of public employees. The recent experience in Wisconsin provides a window into what a post-Abood world will almost certainly look like. It is an environment in which public union power is significantly constrained, had little flexibility in managing their retiree health expenses. Large, traditional manufacturing companies -with high concentrations of unionized retirees and historically generous benefit packages, but shrinking active workforces and negative economic forecasts -found themselves struggling to remain financially viable in the face of overwhelming liabilities. The public sector today faces similar problems. Because GASB 45 demands that government employers acknowledge the true level of retiree health offers, they risk balance sheet disasters. Most have financed retiree health benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, with no assets set aside for future expenses. Many are heavily unionized, with little room to shift costs to retirees, much less to terminate benefits. Some have constitutional or statutory guarantees that protect benefit commitments. Although they do not risk liquidation the way private sector employers do, financial insolvency affects state and local governments' ability to raise money to finance public services and projects. Government employers, moreover, depend on the good will of taxpayers. They cannot easily raise taxes or divert funds from other sources. Meanwhile, the current depressed economy translates to severe budget problems for state and local governments across the country. The similarities between the public sector today and the private sector of the early 1990s raise intriguing questions about possible solutions for the public sector. Id. at 880-881.
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membership levels drop and public union political activity decreases. These changes appear to have made unilateral reductions in the cost of public sector employee benefits politically feasible resulting in savings to taxpayers. The Freidrichs decision leaves the problem of forced speech by public employees unresolved. As states continue to grapple with rapidly escalating benefits costs in the public sector, one would expect to see another Freidrichs-type challenge emerge in the not too distant future.
